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Recent Cases
The Second Circuit
Holds That An
Anti-Discrimination
Provision Of The Fair
Housing Act Applies to
Human Models in
Advertisements
In Ragin v. New York Times, 923

F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that section
3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.
(1988), which prohibited publication of advertisements suggesting
racial preference, applied to human models in real estate advertisements published in newspapers. The court also held that
application of section 3604(c) of
the Fair Housing Act to newspapers did not violate the first
amendment.
Background
Luther M. Ragin, Jr. ("Ragin")
and other individuals were black
persons who sought housing in the
New York metropolitan area. The
Open Housing Center, Inc. ("Open
Housing"), an equal housing organization, joined Ragin and the
other individuals in a suit against
the New York Times Co. ("the
Times"), publisher of The New
York Times. Ragin and Open
Housing asserted that real estate
advertisements in the Sunday editions of The New York Times violated the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) and (c) (1988),
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1988), the Civil
Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1988), and the thirteenth
amendment.
The complaint stated that during the twenty year period since the
Act was passed, the Times published advertisements containing
thousands of human models, virtually none of whom were black.
Furthermore, while the white human models depicted potential
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homeowners and tenants, the few
black models in the advertisements
usually represented maintenance
workers, small children, or cartoon
characters.
In addition, Ragin and Open
Housing claimed that the Times
published advertisements targeted
to certain racial groups which indicated a preference on the basis of
race. Ragin and Open Housing
stated that the Times incorporated
all-white models in advertisements
directed to white communities.
Similarly, the few advertisements
that depicted black human models
as potential homeowners or tenants were for real estate located in
predominantly black communities. Ragin and Open Housing
sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory
and punitive damages.
The Times moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be
granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
The district court partially granted
the motion and dismissed the
claims based on the thirteenth
amendment, sections 1981 and
1982 of the Civil Rights Act, and
section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing
Act.
The district court, however, denied the motion for the claim
based upon section 3604(c) of the
Fair Housing Act. The lower court
concluded: (1) proof at trial of the
alleged advertising patterns would
adequately support a finding that
the Times violated the Fair Housing Act, (2) the first amendment
did not protect illegal commercial
speech, (3) requiring the press to
monitor advertisements would not
impose an unconstitutional burden, and (4) the statute provided
constitutionally adequate notice of
the prohibited conduct. The Times
appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
The Appellate Court's Opinion
Statutory Issues

The Second Circuit first ad-

dressed the arguments of the
Times under section 3604(c) of the
Fair Housing Act. Section 3604(c)
provides that it is unlawful to
publish real estate advertisements
which indicate any racial preference. The court found that the
statute banned advertisements
which suggested racial preference
to an ordinary reader. The ordinary reader, the court concluded,
was one who was neither overly
suspicious nor insensitive. Furthermore, the appellate court
maintained that section 3604(c)
prohibited racially biased advertisements, regardless of the advertiser's intent. The court recognized
that although intent may be necessary for factual determinations, it
was irrelevant in determining the
advertisement's general message.
The court next defined the situations in which section 3604(c) applied. The court agreed with the
Times that liability may not be
based on an aggregation of different advertisers. Instead, the court
found the Fair Housing Act applied only to individual advertisers. Additionally, section 3604 of
the Fair Housing Act encompassed
human models in advertisements
since the statute did not limit the
prohibition to racial messages conveyed by particular means. The
court noted that nothing in the
statute's text or legislative history
showed congressional intent to exclude subtle methods of indicating
racial preference.
The appellate court rejected the
Times's argument that application
of section 3604(c) to newspapers
would promote racial quotas. The
court noted that the choice of
models for advertisements involved very different considerations from those relating to selection of persons for employment
opportunities, the usual forum for
the quota controversy. The court
found that since advertisers arbitrarily determined everything in
their "make-up-your-own-world"
of advertisements, the inclusion of
a black model where necessary was
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not an overwhelming burden to the
newspaper. Also, because the number of black models used would be
entirely discretionary, such requirements would not impose a
"quota" on the inclusion of black
models. Furthermore, the court
held that inclusion of such models
would not significantly burden the
numerous arbitrary decisions
made in every advertisement.
Based on the standards above, the
court held that the complaint could
not be dismissed for failure to state
a claim, as the complaint alleged a
longstanding pattern in real estate
advertisements indicating racial
preference.
Constitutional Issues
The Times also argued that section 3604(c) was void for vagueness. The court noted that regardless of whether the vagueness
doctrine applied to civil actions,
the ordinary reader standard provided constitutionally sufficient
notice of the prohibited conduct.
Thus, the statute did not fail on the
basis of vagueness.
Next, the Times claimed that
application of section 3604(c) to
newspapers violated the first
amendment. The court noted that
the first amendment gave less protection to commercial speech than
to other constitutionally protected
speech. The first amendment did
not protect commercial speech relating to illegal activity. The court
noted that the Fair Housing Act
prohibited advertisements displaying racial preferences. Therefore,
the first amendment did not protect advertisements which violated
section 3604(c) and promoted illegal activity, discrimination in the
sale or rental of real estate.
The court also addressed the
supposed unconstitutional burdens imposed on the Times by
section 3604(c). First, the court
reviewed the Times's argument
that application of the Fair Housing Act to newspapers would disrupt the function of the free press.
Citing Supreme Court precedent,
the court concluded that section
3604(c) would not compromise the
unique position of the free press.
The Times also argued that section 3604(c) would unconstitutionally burden newspapers by compelVolume 3 Number 4/Summer, 1991

ling them to enforce the law under
the Fair Housing Act. The appellate court, however, rejected this
argument. The court held that the
"would-be regulators" were not the
publishers, but the offended readers, such as Ragin and Open Housing. These readers bore the burden
of proving racial preference in the
advertisements. Therefore, the
court concluded that section
3604(c) did not place an unconstitutional burden on the publishers.
Lastly, the court dismissed the
Times's argument that the publisher was "ill-equipped" to monitor
the advertisements. The court noted that advertisements were routinely and extensively reviewed before they were published in the
newspaper. Therefore, monitoring
the advertisements for racial messages did not impose an unconstitutional burden upon the publisher.
The Second Circuit accordingly
affirmed the district court's decision and held that section 3604(c)
of the Fair Housing Act applied to
human models and that its application to newspapers did not violate
the first amendment.
Richard E. Nawracaj

No Strict Liability For
Manufacturer of
Unavoidably Unsafe
Blood-Clotting Agent
Which Gave Woman
AIDS
In Jane Doe and John Doe v.
Miles Laboratories, Inc, Cutter
Laboratories Div., No. 90-2605
(4th Cir. March 7, 1991)(WESTLAW), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that Koyne, a blood-clotting agent
manufactured by Miles Laboratories, Inc., Cutter Laboratories Division ("Miles"), was unavoidably
unsafe, and therefore, Miles was
not subject to strict liability in tort.
The court also held that Miles met
the applicable standard of care and
had no duty to warn of the possible
dangers associated with Koyne;
therefore, Miles was not negligent.

Background
In September of 1983, after the
delivery of her child, Jane Doe
("Mrs. Doe") began suffering from
excessive vaginal bleeding. After
substantial amounts of blood components failed to control Mrs.
Doe's bleeding, her physician administered Koyne, a blood-clotting
agent comprised of highly concentrated Factor IX. Factor IX was an
essential blood-clotting component derived from thousands of
human blood plasma donations
and was very effective in stopping
uncontrolled bleeding. Mrs. Doe's
Koyne was distributed by Miles in
January of 1983, which was prior
to the availability of an approved
test to identify the presence of the
human immunodeficiency virus
("HIV"), the virus responsible for
the deadly acquired immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS"). Mrs.
Doe was subsequently diagnosed
as having been infected with HIV,
and she possessed no AIDS high
risk factors that could otherwise
account for her infection.
On August 14, 1986, the Does
sued Miles in the United States
District Court for the District of
Maryland based on strict liability
and negligence. They asked the
court to hold Miles strictly liable
based upon a finding that blood
and blood products were unreasonably dangerous products. The Does
also asserted that Miles was negligent in two ways: (1) by failing to
assure adequately the safety of
their product, and (2) by failing to
warn adequately those who administered the product of the risk that
it may transmit AIDS.
The District Court's Decision
In Doe v. Miles Laboratories,
Inc, 675 F.Supp. 1466 (D. Md.
1987), the district court initially
held that Miles was subject to strict
liability in tort as a manufacturer
of blood or blood products, and
denied Miles's motion for summary judgment. However, the district
court then reconsidered and certified to the Maryland Court of
Appeals the issue of whether a
supplier of blood or blood products
was subject to strict liability in tort.
(continued on page 142)
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